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BY ANY MEANS: HOW ONE FEDERAL AGENCY IS 
TURNING TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY ON ITS HEAD 
 
Clifton Cottrell * 
 
The federal trust responsibility to Indian tribes 
underlies both the “government-to-government 
relationship” with Indian tribes and the imperative 
that federal agencies not actively impede the 
economic development and self-determination of 
Indian tribes, and that they engage in meaningful 
consultation when any federal undertaking might 
impact tribes in a significant way. 
 
The Honorable Sherry Treppa, Chairperson, Habematolel Pomo of 
Upper Lake, 20161 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, the chairperson and leader of the Habematolel 
Pomo of Upper Lake (Upper Lake), Sherry Treppa, testified before 
the United States House of Representatives at a hearing titled Short-
Term, Small Dollar Lending: The CFPB’s Assault on Access to 
Credit and Trampling of State and Tribal Sovereignty.2 She spoke 
ardently about the economic opportunity afforded to her tribe after 
a lending entity created by the tribal government began issuing 
small-dollar installment loans online. In a few short years, Upper 
Lake managed to expand their lending operations, creating 
desperately needed jobs in the community and funding significant 
social programs critical to the preservation of tribal culture, 
promotion of education, and development of further economic 
                                                
*Clifton Cottrell is an enrolled member of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma 
and a graduate of the Baylor University School of Law. He lives in central 
Pennsylvania where he works as the Director of Policy and Research for the 
Native American Financial Services Association. 
1 Short-Term, Small Dollar Lending: The CFPB’s Assault on Access to Credit 
and Trampling of State and Tribal Sovereignty: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 114th Cong. 
(2016) (statement of Honorable Sherry Treppa, Chairperson, Habematolel Pomo 
of Upper Lake) [hereinafter Short-Term, Small Dollar Lending]. 
2 Id. 
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opportunity. For a tribe located hours away from the nearest major 
economic center, e-commerce was just the industry to restore 
prosperity to the community. 
On April 27, 2017, the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau3 (CFPB or Bureau), an independent federal agency tasked 
with policing financial markets, initiated a lawsuit against four tribal 
lending entities (TLEs) owned and operated by Upper Lake, styled 
CFPB v. Golden Valley Lending, Inc., Silver Cloud Financial, Inc., 
Mountain Summit Financial, Inc., and Majestic Lake Financial, 
Inc.4 The complaint alleges violations of the federal Truth in 
Lending Act (TILA) and the Consumer Financial Protection Act 
(CFP Act) for unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices 
(UDAAP).5 While federal regulators like the Federal Trade 
Commission have relied on TILA and UDAAP (including 
UDAAP’s previous form under section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act) for decades, the CFPB’s lawsuit against Upper 
Lake’s TLEs is monumental; the Bureau seeks to impose state usury 
and licensing laws on a sovereign tribal enterprise via a dubious 
enforcement statute. 
Now the tribe’s lending operations are embroiled in 
litigation against the CFPB while the agency possibly operates 
outside the traditional checks and balances of the United States 
Constitution. The unique and potentially unaccountable structure of 
the CFPB, combined with the Bureau’s narrow directive, created an 
agency agenda with little oversight and a dangerous interpretation 
of its mission. Even in an area in which Congress expressly forbids 
the agency from rulemaking, the CFPB is now seeking to 
circumvent legislative intent through the use of a subjective 
administrative tool called UDAAP. The result is a truly 
                                                
3 The CFPB is an agency charged with supervising and developing rules for 
consumer financial markets. The Bureau is housed under the Federal Reserve in 
the Department of the Treasury. The CFPB enforces nineteen different 
consumer finance laws. 
4 CFPB Sues Four Online Lenders for Collecting on Debts Consumers Did Not 
Legally Owe, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Apr. 27, 2017), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-sues-four-online-
lenders-collecting-debts-consumers-did-not-legally-owe/ 
[https://perma.cc/P6RQ-S9NM]. 
5 Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief at 1, CFPB v. Golden 
Valley Lending, Inc., No. 17-cv-3155 (E.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 2017) [hereinafter 
CFPB Complaint], 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201704_cfpb_Golden-
Valley_Silver-Cloud_Majestic-Lake_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Q68-
6Q37]. 
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unprecedented legal challenge: a federal agency is attempting to 
impose state laws, laws which it is forbidden from promulgating 
itself, on sovereign tribal entities via a nebulous enforcement 
standard. This suit not only threatens vital economic development 
opportunities for an isolated tribe, but it also endangers the very 
basis of tribal sovereignty and preemption of state law in Indian 
affairs. It is a case that must be watched closely, not just by the 
handful of scattered tribes participating in small-dollar internet 
lending, but by all of Indian Country. If the courts side with the 
CFPB’s interpretation of sovereign tribal status vis-à-vis state law, 
sovereignty could lose all effect in tribal economic development. 
One of the hallmarks of federal Indian policy in the era of self-
determination, the extension of sovereignty to tribal commercial 
activities, would be forever lost. 
This article explores the unique set of circumstances that led 
to the CFPB’s lawsuit against Upper Lake. Part I begins by 
providing background on the Upper Lake Tribe, the CFPB, and the 
Bureau’s authority to bring suit against the TLEs. Part II addresses 
the complaint, recounts the alleged violations, and discusses the 
history and previous efforts by federal regulators with UDAAP. 
Finally, Part III analyzes some of the major tribal concerns with the 
Bureau’s complaint, including preemption, sovereignty, rate 
exporting, and self-determination. In a time when the majority of 
tribes still struggle to provide meaningful economic opportunity in 
their communities, the CFPB must not succeed in eroding the one 
component of tribal sovereignty that makes e-commerce on 
reservations possible. 
 
II. FROM THE BLOODY ISLAND MASSACRE TO THE MORTGAGE 
CRISIS OF 2008: UNDERSTANDING THE ORIGINS OF  
UPPER LAKE AND THE CFPB 
 
 The Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake, numbering only a 
few hundred members in rural northern California, have 
experienced a mixture of fortunes since their ancestors settled in the 
Clear Lake area thousands of years ago. From near annihilation by 
United States soldiers in the nineteenth century to a protracted battle 
to regain federal recognition after their rancheria was terminated in 
the 1950s, the tribe’s existence is a testament to perseverance in the 
face of incredible adversity. Not content with simple recognition, 
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Upper Lake now boasts robust lending operations originating 
millions of dollars in loans and executing over half a million credit 
inquiries annually.6 The revenues generated by Upper Lake’s TLEs 
help fund vital sovereign governmental functions and allow the tribe 
to provide important educational and social services for its 
members. 
 In contrast, the CFPB began its life as a concept by an 
aspiring politician envisioning a powerful federal agency to oversee 
the many concerns regarding consumer finance. The need for such 
an agency accelerated after poor oversight of mortgage lending and 
the United States banking system led to a massive collapse of 
American financial institutions and the worst recession in our 
country since the Great Depression. The passage of the Dodd–Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank) 
ushered in a new era of consumer financial regulation, shifting an 
incredible amount of regulatory power and autonomy to the freshly 
minted CFPB. The unique management structure of the agency with 
a single independent director ensured neither Congress, the 
President, nor any special interest groups would have any substantial 
influence on the Bureau’s operations. Further, the broad language 
found in the CFP Act permitted the CFPB considerable leverage to 
assert its important function as watchdog over the consumer finance 
industry. 
This section recounts the circumstances surrounding the 
development of modern tribal government operations at Upper 
Lake, as well as explains the regulatory structure supporting its 
lending operations. It continues with a review of the events that led 
to the formation of the CFPB and an overview of the Bureau’s 
authority regarding consumer finance and tribes. 
 The Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake are located on the 
northern upper reaches of Clear Lake in northern California. The 
most recent United States census estimates the population of the 
Upper Lake Rancheria at 143 residents.7 The tribe is bordered by 
Clear Lake to the south and the expansive Mendocino National 
Forest to the north. The nearest major metropolitan area is 
Sacramento, more than two hours away by car. Upper Lake is 
                                                
6 Id. at 9. 
7 My Tribal Area: Upper Lake Rancheria, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/tribal/ [https://perma.cc/7ZWB-RLAG].  
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hampered by the same geographic and economic isolation indicative 
of Native communities across the United States. 
 Upper Lake can trace its roots to the area back more than 
8,000 years when their ancestors settled around Clear Lake and 
looked to the abundance of the surrounding marshlands for 
sustenance.8 The local presence of obsidian for toolmaking 
enhanced the value of the land for early inhabitants. The massive 
forestlands just north of the lake saw extensive use by Yuki, 
Nomlaki Wintu, Patwin Wintu, Eastern Pomo, and Northeastern 
Pomo groups.9 By 1800, there were upwards of 18,000 Pomo 
Indians living in California speaking seven distinct languages.10 In 
1850, United States soldiers slaughtered many of the women and 
children of Upper Lake in the Bloody Island Massacre, part of a 
government policy to subdue California Indians and consolidate 
their control of increasingly valuable lands. Only one young girl 
survived the assault, hiding from troops by submerging herself in 
the lake and breathing through a reed.11 The remaining tribal 
members were organized onto a rancheria in 1907, one of six such 
communities on the shores of Clear Lake. 
 The tribe’s federal recognition and trust lands were short 
lived; the California Rancheria Termination Act dissolved the Upper 
Lake Rancheria and effectively extinguished their federal status.12 
A group of tribal members later formed the Upper Lake Pomo 
Association and sued the federal government to restore their federal 
recognition and trust lands. The tribe received federal recognition 
again in 1979, and trust lands were restored in 2008.13 With renewed 
recognition, the members of Upper Lake wrote and ratified a new 
constitution in 2004.14 With restored lands and a formalized 
governance structure in their new constitution, Upper Lake set about 
                                                
8 The Tribe’s History and Culture, HABEMATOLEL POMO OF UPPER LAKE, 
http://www.upperlakepomo.com/forms/brochure.pdf (last visited July 2, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/KU5B-F9GF]. 
9 Mendocino Forest: About the Forest, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
https://www.fs.usda.gov/main/mendocino/about-forest (last visited July 2, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/R6BY-E7DY]. 
10 Upper Lake belongs to the Northern and Eastern language groups. 
11 Short-Term, Small Dollar Lending, supra note 1, at 129. 
12 California Rancheria Termination Act, Pub. L. No. 85-671, 72 Stat. 619 
(1958). 
13 See Upper Lake Pomo Association v. Cecil Andrus, No. C-75-0181-SW (N.D. 
Cal. 1979). 
14 See generally HABEMATOLEL POMO OF UPPER LAKE CONST. (2004), 
http://www.upperlakepomo.com/forms/HPUL-Constitution.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X2DQ-JWZS]. 
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asserting their sovereign rights and exploring economic 
development opportunities. 
 For tribes located far from economic hubs or major 
transportation networks, economic opportunities can be extremely 
limited. Some tribal communities can rely on resource exploitation 
of their lands through mining, farming, hunting and fishing, or 
logging to provide jobs and revenues. The modern Upper Lake 
Rancheria began about a decade ago with a transfer into trust of just 
11.24 acres, too little land for timber harvesting or farming.15 
E-commerce, in particular, short-term small-dollar online lending, 
presented a promising industry, allowing the tribe to provide 
services across the nation through a simple internet connection. The 
tribe set up a TLE to lend small amounts of money, generally only 
a few hundred dollars repaid in monthly installments, to needy 
households across the country via the world wide web. To manage 
the complex and evolving requirements of consumer financial law, 
Upper Lake set off to create a robust system of regulatory controls 
to guide their lending operations. 
 The Upper Lake TLEs are governed by an extensive set of 
lending codes developed by the tribal council. In her testimony 
before Congress, Chairperson Treppa noted, “This lending 
ordinance prohibits tribal licensees from engaging in unfair, 
deceptive, or fraudulent practices, or engaging in any consumer 
financial services other than those expressly permitted under that 
ordinance.”16 To oversee the enforcement of its lending code, the 
tribe instituted an independent regulatory commission: “This 
regulatory commission is a separate division of the Tribe’s 
government, which means that it operates independently of our 
tribal government. The commission has the autonomy to exercise its 
enforcement authority should a lending business violate the 
consumer protection laws that we established.”17  To ultimately 
issue the loans, the tribal government developed a series of TLEs to 
provide small-dollar installment loans to consumers online. 
 Four different lending operations were named in the suit by 
the CFPB, and all are owned and operated by the Upper Lake tribal 
government.18 Apart from the actual lending companies, the tribe 
                                                
15 Short-Term, Small Dollar Lending, supra note 1, at 130 (statement of Hon. 
Sherry Treppa, Chairperson, Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake). 
16 Id. at 131. 
17 Id. at 131. 
18 CFPB Complaint, supra note 5, at 2. 
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also owns a customer support center and lead generator. Lead 
generators solicit business through advertising and other forms of 
communication with potential customers. The Bureau’s complaint 
highlights the productivity of the TLEs: “From August 2013 to 
December 2013, Silver Cloud and Golden Valley originated a total 
of approximately $27 million in loans and collected a total of 
approximately $44 million from consumers.”19 The CFPB also pled 
that Golden Valley Lending could originate 235 loans in one day, 
an amount the Bureau labeled as a “large volume.”20 Between 
February 2013 and June 2016, the TLEs performed over 597,000 
credit inquiries on potential borrowers.21 For a tribe that only 
recently recovered its federal sovereign status, e-commerce through 
small-dollar online lending has been a boon to tribal social 
programs. Safeguarding this vital revenue stream is another chapter 
in the tribe’s fight for survival. 
 In contrast to the travails of Upper Lake, the CFPB has 
wielded considerable power and influence in its short existence. The 
Bureau was originally conceptualized by future United States 
Senator Elizabeth Warren, a law professor at Harvard University of 
Cherokee and Delaware descent. In 2007, she wrote an article for 
Democracy Journal in which she lamented the fact that toaster 
ovens received more scrutiny from federal regulators than home 
mortgages.22 In a now-famous comparison, she wrote: 
 
It is impossible to buy a toaster that has a one-in-five 
chance of bursting into flames and burning down 
your house. But it is possible to refinance an existing 
home with a mortgage that has the same one-in-five 
chance of putting the family out on the street—and 
the mortgage won’t even carry a disclosure of that 
fact to the homeowner.23 
 
She decried the failures of federal regulators at that time, concerned 
more with maintaining the soundness and profitability of the 
banking and finance industries than the wellbeing of consumers. 
                                                
19 Id. at 6. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 9. 
22 Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, 5 DEMOCRACY: A JOURNAL OF IDEAS, 
Summer 2007, http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/5/unsafe-at-any-rate/ 
[https://perma.cc/VY32-6VXU]. 
23 Id. 
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Prof. Warren would go on to propose a new federal agency for 
consumer finance modeled after the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission.24 
 Warren’s new consumer watchdog would clarify and 
standardize financial products, similar to how other federal agencies 
had created safety consistencies in products like appliances and 
automobiles. She was especially concerned about the language 
financial institutions used in agreements with consumers, explaining 
that “lenders have deliberately built tricks and traps into some credit 
products so they can ensnare families in a cycle of high-cost debt.”25 
Simplifying complexity and pressing for transparency in loan 
agreements would be important factors in leveling the playing field 
in consumer finance and ridding the industry of bad actors. 
 Barely a year from the publication of Prof. Warren’s call for 
a new federal consumer finance regulatory agency, she was elected 
to the United States Senate, and America encountered one of its 
worst financial collapses since the Great Depression. Between the 
last quarter of 2007 and the first quarter of 2009, household net 
worth declined $12 trillion.26 Nine million Americans lost their 
jobs.27 Relaxed government oversight and loose underwriting in the 
subprime home market played a heavy hand in triggering the 
meltdown.28 Just as the domino effect of mortgage defaults and bank 
failures picked up pace, the United States Department of the 
Treasury finished a report outlining a new consumer protection 
agency based on Senator Warren’s prior recommendations. The new 
federal agency would be guided by transparency, simplicity, and 
access.29 The Bureau would protect consumers from unfair, 
                                                
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Households and Nonprofit Organizations; Net Worth, Level (April 2017), 
FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TNWBSHNO [https://perma.cc/3GUZ-T7CR]. 
27 Consumer Spending and U.S. Employment from 2007–2009 Recession 
Through 2022, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Oct. 
2014), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2014/article/consumer-spending-and-us-
employment-from-the-recession-through-2022.htm [https://perma.cc/666C-
Q5DC]. 
28 See Jeff Holt, A Summary of the Primary Causes of the Housing Bubble and 
the Resulting Credit Crisis: A Non-Technical Paper, 8 J. BUS. INQUIRY 120 
(2009) (discussing that housing bubble was caused by a combination of low 
mortgage interest rates, low short-term interest rates, relaxed standards for 
mortgage loans, and irrational exuberance). 
29 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW 
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 63–71 
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deceptive, and abusive acts, promote accountability, and prevent 
regulatory arbitrage.30 The agency, operating independently of the 
executive branch (similar to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission), would be governed by a director and board. It would 
retain supervisory and enforcement authority over nonbank 
financial institutions and would coordinate enforcement efforts with 
the states.31 The major federal legislation written to arrest the 
mortgage crisis, the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, would borrow heavily from Senator Warren’s paper 
and the Treasury report. 
 The Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 established the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau with the responsibility to regulate 
consumer financial products and services and enforce consumer 
protection laws.32 The CFP Act deviated in a major way from the 
Treasury’s recommendations regarding management structure; the 
final legislation established only a single director to oversee the 
Bureau’s operations. Further, the CFPB’s director can be fired only 
for cause, which includes “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or 
malfeasance in office.”33 President Obama chose Ohio Attorney 
General Richard Cordray to serve as the first director of the Bureau 
for a term of five years. His appointment was not without 
controversy. Cordray was originally nominated to the post in 2011, 
a year after Dodd–Frank created the agency. After uproar over the 
president’s use of his recess appointment authority sparked 
Republican outrage and a lawsuit,34 Cordray was finally confirmed 
by the Senate in 2013.35 The director and his agency have been under 
fire ever since. 
For many reasons, the CFPB has come under considerable 
scrutiny and consternation from federal courts and legal scholars.36 
                                                
(2009), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/54K8-SBP2]. 
30 Id. at 57. 
31 Id. at 59–61. 
32 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 1011, 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) 
(2012)). 
33 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (2012). 
34 See State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, 795 F.3d 48 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
35 See Megan Slack, Senate Confirms Richard Cordray as Consumer Watchdog, 
THE WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA (July 17, 2017, 6:46 PM), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2013/07/17/senate-confirms-richard-
cordray-consumer-watchdog [https://perma.cc/6N26-YWJG]. 
36 See, e.g., PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (single, 
independent director structure of agency violates separation of powers 
10 
 
Originally, officials envisioned a structure for the Bureau that 
avoided capture by special interest groups and other corrupting 
influences. At the time of its formation, there were massive amounts 
of campaign contributions and other considerations funneling from 
the finance and banking industries to politicians.37 An independent 
agency structure would shield Bureau officials from the influence of 
politics and industry in fulfilling the CFPB’s mission. Dodd–Frank 
opted for a single director to head the agency, eschewing the 
Treasury’s recommendation to also include a governing board. The 
CFP Act further bucked trends by giving the director of the CFPB 
broad policy powers in the form of rulemaking, supervision, and 
enforcement, breaking from the more traditional market monitoring 
functions of independent agency directors at the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency and the Food and Drug 
Administration.38 Dodd–Frank went even further by exempting the 
CFPB from the Congressional appropriations process, instead 
setting aside a significant portion of the Federal Reserve’s annual 
budget to be used for whatever purposes were desired by the 
Bureau’s director.39 The totality of these choices did not just 
construct an agency insulated from political and financial influence, 
it also forged an agency with a narrow mission, substantial funding, 
and little accountability to the president or Congress. 
To add to the Bureau’s massive coffers and independence, 
Dodd–Frank bestowed upon the CFPB extensive supervisory, 
enforcement, and rulemaking authority. In general, the Bureau 
“shall seek to implement and, where applicable, enforce Federal 
consumer financial law consistently for the purpose of ensuring that 
all consumers have access to markets for consumer financial 
products and services and that markets for consumer financial 
products and services are fair, transparent, and competitive.”40 The 
CFPB fulfills its purpose through market monitoring, enforcement 
                                                
enumerated in the U.S. Constitution), reh’g en banc granted, order vacated 
(Feb. 16, 2017); Brenden Soucy, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: 
The Solution or the Problem?, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 691 (2013); Eric Pearson, 
A Brief Essay on the Constitutionality of the Consumer Finance Protection 
Bureau, 47 CREIGHTON L. REV. 99 (2013). 
37 Pearson, supra note 36, at 103. 
38 Todd J. Zywicki, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Savior or 
Menace?, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 874 (2013). 
39 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 1017, 124 Stat. 1376, 1975 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5497 (2012)). 
40 Id. at § 1021(a), 124 Stat. at 1979–80. 
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against unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices, financial 
education programs, and rulemaking that complements existing 
consumer finance laws. One important limitation on the CFPB is a 
prohibition on the agency from enacting any type of usury or interest 
rate limit for credit offered by a “covered person” under the CFP 
Act.41 Before proceeding to the CFPB’s complaint against Upper 
Lake’s TLEs and discussion on the Bureau’s authority in that 
instance, it is first important to review another pending case where 
the CFPB is attempting to exert its authority over another group of 
TLEs. 
Great Plains Lending v. CFPB concerns the Bureau’s use of 
civil investigative demands (CIDs) while exploring potential 
violations of consumer finance laws by TLEs associated with the 
Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Oklahoma, the Chippewa Cree Tribe, and 
the Tunica-Biloxi Tribe.42 The Ninth Circuit recently heard an 
appeal in the case centering on whether tribal governments and their 
sovereign economic subdivisions are “covered persons” under the 
CFP Act, and thus subject to CIDs.43 When the CFPB originally 
sought to engage the TLEs through a CID, the tribes instructed the 
TLEs not to comply, instead offering to oversee any investigations 
via their tribal regulatory agencies. In federal court, the TLEs argued 
that since the CFP Act treats states, defined to include federally 
recognized Indian tribes, as co-regulators with the CFPB of federal 
consumer financial laws, the CFPB lacked the jurisdiction to 
regulate TLEs directly without the cooperation of tribal regulators.44 
The court rejected this argument. 
The Ninth Circuit ruled that the CFP Act was a law of 
general applicability.45 In doing so, the three exceptions developed 
in Donovan v. Couer d’Alene Tribal Farms46 were applied to resolve 
whether the CFP Act would ultimately be imposed on the TLEs. The 
court explained that a law of general applicability will apply to a 
tribe unless: 
                                                
41 Id. at § 1027(o), 124 Stat. at 2003. 
42 CFPB v. Great Plains Lending, 846 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that 
the CFP Act is a law of general applicability and applies to tribes in the manner 
of civil investigative demands by the agency). 
43 Id. at 1053. 
44 Id. at 1050. 
45 Id. at 1051. 
46 See Donovan v. Couer d’Alene Tribal Farms, 751 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 
1985). 
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(1) the law touches exclusive rights of self-
governance in purely intramural matters; (2) the 
application of the law to the tribe would abrogate 
rights guaranteed by Indian treaties; or (3) there is 
proof by legislative history or some other means that 
Congress intended the law not to apply to Indians on 
their reservations.47 
 
Finding that none of the exceptions applied in this instance, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the CFP Act applied to TLEs in the issuance 
of CIDs.48 The TLEs have expressed their desire to appeal this 
decision to the United States Supreme Court and were recently 
granted an extension to file a petition for writ of certiorari.49 
Depending upon the outcome of the Great Plains case at the United 
States Supreme Court, the CFPB may find itself arguing the 
applicability of the CFP Act to Upper Lake’s TLEs before a district 
court in Illinois. 
 Both the Upper Lake Pomo and CFPB experienced 
tremendous growth over the past few years. The tenacity of Upper 
Lake’s members helped the tribe regain federal recognition, trust 
lands, and sovereign power to provide for their people through 
e-commerce. On the other side, almost overnight the CFPB went 
from a pipe dream by a law-professor-come-consumer-advocate to 
a powerful, independent federal agency with incredible statutory 
authority and deep pockets because of a major financial crisis. The 
CFPB is now placing its immense resources into a unique challenge 
to the economic activity of a sovereign tribal nation. The arguments 
put forth by the CFPB are unprecedented and warrant examination. 
 
III. A COMPLAINT NEVER BEFORE SEEN IN  
    INDIAN COUNTRY 
 
 The CFPB alleges two major violations in its initial 
complaint against the Upper Lake TLEs. First, the Bureau alleges a 
violation of the Truth in Lending Act.50 Next, the CFPB argues the 
tribal lending operations participated in unfair, deceptive, and 
abusive acts or practices by collecting on loans in states in which the 
                                                
47 Id. at 1116. 
48 See CFPB v. Great Plains Lending, 846 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2017). 
49 Id., petition for cert. filed (Aug. 3, 2017). 
50 CFPB Complaint, supra note 5, at 9. 
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TLEs failed to secure state lending licenses and charged annual 
percentage rates (APR) higher than the state usury cap permits.51 
This section reviews the history behind TILA and UDAAP in 
relation to the CFPB’s complaint, focusing particularly on how the 
agency is utilizing UDAAP to impose state laws the Bureau itself is 
forbidden from developing. 
 TILA appeared in the late 1960s as a way to standardize loan 
disclosure forms.52 It requires a clear disclosure of certain loan 
terms, most importantly the APR of the product. One would expect 
that a law with such a simple purpose would be simple in and of 
itself, especially considering Senator Warren’s deep concern that 
banks and lenders use loan terms to “trick and trap” consumers. 
Unfortunately, TILA is anything but simple. Congress has amended 
TILA more than twenty times since its inception; the law spawned 
more than 10,000 lawsuits in its first decade of existence.53 The law 
itself now covers fifty pages. The implementation rule for TILA, 
Regulation Z, has been amended at least fifty times and garnered 
more than 1,500 agency interpretations.54 TILA regulations and 
guidance are a far cry from the transparency that stood as a hallmark 
principle during the development of the CFPB. 
 In its complaint, the Bureau explained that the Upper Lake 
TLEs failed to disclose the APR until the final loan agreement, 
giving the borrowers only a more generalized estimate of financing 
costs through advertisements and websites.55 The TLEs expressed 
the interest in terms not based on APR, but by “generally 
describ[ing] the finance charge for each installment payment as a 
block rate of $30 per $100 of principal, a 30% finance charge, or the 
total amount the consumer would have to repay.” Regardless of the 
outcome on rate disclosures, it is the Bureau’s UDAAP allegations 
that potentially carry a more significant impact to how Indian 
Country conducts business. 
 UDAAP stands for unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or 
practices. It is the CFPB’s general enforcement tool for unlawful 
behavior by financial institutions outside the nearly twenty federal 
                                                
51 CFPB Complaint, supra note 5, at 23–25. 
52 Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146, 148 (1968) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (2012)). 
53 Todd Zywicki, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Savior or 
Menace?, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 905–06 (2013). 
54 Id. at 906. 
55 CFPB Complaint, supra note 5, at 9. 
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laws that regulate online small-dollar lending. UDAAP’s origins 
date back more than a century, getting its start during the trust-
busting years prior to World War I. Although originally intended to 
stamp out anti-competitive behavior in industry, the CFPB has 
managed to morph UDAAP into an anti-sovereignty weapon. 
 UDAAP in its modern form, minus the abusive part, dates 
back to amendments to section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act in 1938, prohibiting “unfair methods of competition in 
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts in or practices in 
commerce.”56 However, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
another independent federal agency with broad powers over 
consumer protection and anti-competitive business practices, 
pressed some authority over unfair business practices back to the 
agency’s infancy in the early twentieth century. When the FTC was 
established, Congress declined to delineate an exhaustive list of 
unfair behavior, leaving the FTC to issue guidance on the topic.57 
The FTC was and remains governed by a five-member board.58 The 
FTC’s authority under the FTC Act was deliberately left vague by 
Congress because it would be too difficult to list every unfair 
practice, allowing businesses to easily evade regulation through 
loopholes. Lacking a precise definition, it was left to the agency and 
the courts to determine the term’s meaning through the gradual 
process of inclusion and exclusion.59 
 To define “unfair” and “deceptive,” the CFPB borrows 
heavily from past FTC guidance on the terms.60 Section 1061 of 
Dodd–Frank transfers all of the powers, guidance, and rules 
developed for consumer financial protection by the FTC to the 
CFPB, including the original UDAP under the FTC Act.61 
Alternately, the FTC retains the authority to enforce any rules 
                                                
56 Federal Trade Commission Act Amendments of 1938 (Wheeler–Lea Act), 
§ 5(a), Pub. L. No. 75-447, 52 Stat. 111 (1938). 
57 For an early history of the FTC, see Cary Silverman & Jonathan Wilson, State 
Attorney General Enforcement of Unfair and Deceptive Acts or Practices Laws: 
Emerging Concerns and Solutions, 65 KAN. L. REV. 209, 210–12 (2016). 
58 Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 203, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914). 
59 See, e.g., FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648 (1931). 
60 Abusive acts or practices were never included in the FTC’s authority under 
the original UDAP; it was only recently added when UDAP was shifted to the 
CFPB by the Dodd–Frank Act. Subsequently, the FTC has never offered any 
guidance or further explanation of “abusive.” 
61 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 2, 124 Stat. 1376, 1386 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5301 (2012)). 
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related to the FTC Act promulgated by the CFPB. Under Dodd–
Frank, prior interpretations of the FTC Act by the FTC will still 
receive deference from federal courts.62 While this massive transfer 
of authority and prior guidance on UDAAP ensured consistency 
between FTC’s UDAP and CFPB’s UDAAP, it also means that the 
CFPB is relying upon interpretations of a statute that are decades old 
in many cases, lagging significantly behind the modern business 
practices associated with online lending and financial technology. 
Since the CFPB has asserted violations of each part of UDAAP, the 
three different provisions will be examined independently. 
 
A. Abusive 
  
Abusive acts or practices is a new standard only added 
during the creation of the CFPB in the Dodd–Frank Act. As such, 
the Bureau has yet to proffer any guidance on the meaning of 
“abusive” outside its statutory definition, and Director Cordray 
remains vigilant in refusing to issue agency guidance on UDAAP 
provisions.63 Section 1031(d) of the CFP Act reads as follows: 
 
(d) ABUSIVE.—The Bureau shall have no authority 
under this section to declare an act or practice 
abusive in connection with the provision of a 
consumer financial product or service, unless the act 
or practice— 
(1) materially interferes with the ability of a 
consumer to understand a term or condition 
of a consumer financial product or service; or 
(2) takes unreasonable advantage of— 
(A) a lack of understanding on the 
part of the consumer of the material 
risks, costs, or conditions of the 
product or service; 
(B) the inability of the consumer to 
protect the interests of the consumer 
                                                
62 Id. 
63 The 2016 Semi-Annual Reports of the Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 115th Cong. (2017) 
(statement of CFPB Director Cordray that agency intends to issue no guidance 
on rules/regulations because it would be too much to read). 
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in selecting or using a consumer 
financial product or service; or 
(C) the reasonable reliance by the 
consumer on a covered person to act 
in the interests of the consumer.64 
 
The abusive standard focuses on a consumer’s ability to understand 
the risks and costs associated with a financial product. It has been 
likened to the old and highly subjective “unconscionability” 
standard that has fallen out of favor with courts.65 The abusive 
provision could create a higher duty of care regarding the types of 
products and services offered by companies, but without guidance it 
is impossible to determine just what purpose the standard ultimately 
serves. 
 In its complaint, the CFPB relies heavily upon the TLEs’ 
purported violations of state usury and licensing laws to satisfy the 
materiality and consumer lack of understanding provisions in the 
abusive standard. The CFPB argued, “Consumers residing in the 
Subject States likely were unaware that Defendants lacked the legal 
authority to collect the loans because the loans violated usury and 
licensing laws in those states.”66 By relying upon the alleged 
violations of a state law that does not apply to tribes, the CFPB’s 
argument for abusive acts or practices exists on uneasy footing. 
With a stronger understanding of unfairness and deception, it is easy 
to see why the CFPB is stretching its argument in an attempt to 
regulate tribal commerce. 
 
B. Unfairness 
 
As the two parts of the traditional UDAP standard, “unfair” 
and “deceptive” acts or practices possess a storied and extensive 
history in agency guidance and federal courts. Like “abusive,” 
“unfairness” is also defined in the CFP Act, but “deceptive” was left 
out of Dodd–Frank and relies exclusively on FTC guidance and 
                                                
64 Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1031(d), 
124 Stat. 1955, 2006 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (2012)). 
65 Kate Davidson, New ‘Abusive’ Standard Stokes Fear from Bankers, AM. 
BANKER (Sept. 5, 2011, 7:57 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/new-
abusive-standard-stokes-fear-from-bankers [https://perma.cc/B4ZY-C7PX]. 
66 CFPB Complaint, supra note 5, at 25.  
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court rulings. Section 1031(c) of the CFP Act provides a basic 
definition for unfairness: 
 
(c) UNFAIRNESS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Bureau shall have 
no authority under this section to declare an 
act or practice in connection with a 
transaction with a consumer for a consumer 
financial product or service, or the offering of 
a consumer financial product or service, to be 
unlawful on the grounds that such act or 
practice is unfair, unless the Bureau has a 
reasonable basis to conclude that— 
(A) the act or practice causes or is 
likely to cause substantial injury to 
consumers which is not reasonably 
avoidable by consumers; and  
(B) such substantial injury is not 
outweighed by countervailing 
benefits to consumers or to 
competition. 
(2) CONSIDERATION OF PUBLIC 
POLICIES.—In determining whether an act 
or practice is unfair, the Bureau may consider 
established public policies as evidence to be 
considered with all other evidence. Such 
public policy considerations may not serve as 
a primary basis for such determination.67 
 
 According to guidance developed by the FTC in 1980, three 
standards established by the United States Supreme Court in FTC v. 
Sperry & Hutchinson dictate the unfairness analysis.68 The Sperry 
factors were first explained in a footnote in the Supreme Court’s 
decision and later expanded upon by the agency.69 First, the 
consumer must incur substantial harm. The FTC confirmed that 
                                                
67 Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, § 1031(c), 124 Stat. at 2006. 
68 Letter entitled FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness from Michael Pertschuk, 
FTC Chairman, et al. to Sens. Wendell H. Ford & John C. Danforth (Dec. 17, 
1980), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1980/12/ftc-policy-statement-
unfairness [https://perma.cc/YV7J-DENN]. 
69 FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5 (1972). 
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substantial harm tends to be monetary, like “when sellers coerce 
consumers into buying unwanted goods or services.”70 The CFPB’s 
complaint expresses a tenuous connection between monetary harm 
and the actions of Upper Lake’s TLEs, arguing, “Defendants caused 
substantial injury by servicing, extracting payments for, and 
collecting on loans that laws in the Subject States rendered void or 
limited consumers’ obligation to repay.”71 The CFPB once again 
relied upon the TLEs possible violations of state laws. 
 The second injury consideration requires that the injury to 
consumers not be outweighed by consumer or market competition 
benefits. In particular, the courts will review the net total outcome 
between harm and benefits, only finding this factor satisfied if the 
harm outweighs the countervailing benefits.72 In enforcing its 
unfairness standard, the federal regulators will look for “some form 
of seller behavior that unreasonably creates or takes advantage of an 
obstacle to the free exercise of consumer decision-making.”73 The 
CFPB alleges that consumers lacked awareness as to whether they 
were obligated to repay a loan that does not adhere to state usury 
laws.74 The CFPB also pled that the injuries sustained to consumers 
outweighed the benefits of the loan products but failed to elaborate 
on the imbalance. 
 The CFPB previously brought a suit against a loan service 
provider alleging unfair and deceptive acts, among other things. In 
CFPB v. Intercept Corp., the federal district court in North Dakota 
dismissed the CFPB’s lawsuit on summary judgment for a failure to 
plead sufficient facts.75 In granting the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss, the district court judge wrote: 
 
Although the complaint contains several allegations 
that Intercept engaged in or assisted in unfair acts or 
practices, it never pleads facts sufficient to support 
the legal conclusion that consumers were injured or 
likely to be injured. Nothing in the complaint allows 
the defendants or the court to ascertain whether any 
                                                
70 Letter from Michael Pertschuk, FTC Chairman, supra note 68. 
71 CFPB Complaint, supra note 5, at 9. 
72 Letter from Michael Pertschuk, FTC Chairman, supra note 68. 
73 Letter from Michael Pertschuk, FTC Chairman, supra note 68. 
74 CFPB Complaint, supra note 5, at 9. 
75 CFPB v. Intercept Corp., No. 3:16-cv-144, 2017 WL 3774379 (D.N.D. Mar. 
17, 2017) (dismissing case for failure to plead sufficient facts demonstrating 
harm to consumers). 
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potential injury was or was not counterbalanced by 
benefits to the consumers at issue.76 
 
The conclusory statements by the CFPB in its complaint against the 
Upper Lake TLEs echo the concerns of the North Dakota judge in 
Intercept. If the consumers could not have secured credit from 
another source, the CFPB may struggle to demonstrate harm to the 
consumers. 
 Finally, the injury to consumers must be such that the 
consumers could not have reasonably avoided it. The CFPB has not 
pled anything specific to this component in its complaint. Coupled 
with the scarce facts related to the degree of injury sustained by 
consumers, the CFPB has done little to demonstrate the harm to 
consumers that secured small-dollar installment loans with the 
Upper Lake TLEs. 
 If a regulator can demonstrate that the substantial harm to 
consumers is not outweighed by harm to competition, the court will 
next explore public policy considerations. The regulator should ask 
whether the conduct of the service provider “violates public policy 
established by statute, common law, industry practice, or 
otherwise.”77 This factor often helps the agency further define the 
severity of the injury to consumers. Although not contained in the 
complaint, the public policy considerations conflict between 
consumer protection and tribal economic development. Both are 
heavily memorialized in federal statutes78 and United States 
Supreme Court precedent.79 The competing public policy interests 
surrounding this case will leave the court with much to consider 
should the CFPB advance beyond the harm factor. 
 The final Sperry factor relates to unethical or unscrupulous 
behavior. This final factor was originally intended “to reach conduct 
that violates generally recognized standards of business ethics.”80 
However, as the FTC points out, “conduct that is truly unethical or 
                                                
76 Id. at *4. 
77 Letter from Michael Pertschuk, FTC Chairman, supra note 68. 
78 See generally Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 125 Stat. 1955 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); 
Native American Business Development, Trade Promotion, and Tourism Act of 
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-464, 114 Stat. 2012 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 25 
U.S.C. §§ 4301–4307 (2012)). 
79 Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2043 (2014) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (delineating key goal of federal government to make 
tribes more self-sufficient through economic development). 
80 Letter from Michael Pertschuk, FTC Chairman, supra note 68. 
20 
 
unscrupulous will almost always injure consumers or violate public 
policy as well.”81 Thus, the final factor is never implemented in 
discussion when substantial harm is already present, and the FTC 
relayed that it had no intention of using this final factor. Without 
demonstrating harm in its complaint, the CFPB may strain to prove 
unfairness. 
 
C. Deception 
  
 Although the CFP Act defines the other two standards, it 
does not define deceptive acts or practices. Similar to unfairness, the 
CFPB instead relies on the informed standards of the FTC.82 
Deception further follows a three-part test when determining a 
violation. The CFPB explains, “an act or practice is deceptive when: 
(1) The act or practice misleads or is likely to mislead the consumer; 
(2) The consumer’s interpretation is reasonable under the 
circumstances; and (3) The misleading act or practice is material.”83 
The CFPB again prefaces its complaint under the allegation that the 
Upper Lake TLE loans were void under state law, thereby alleging 
misrepresentations by the tribal lenders whenever they attempted to 
collect on the loans.84 The overwhelmingly conclusory statements 
about harm, misrepresentation, and disclosures in the Bureau’s 
complaint may open the door to allowing the Upper Lake TLEs to 
seek an Intercept-style dismissal on summary judgment for a failure 
by the agency to plead sufficient facts. 
 It is the CFPB’s use of state law against sovereign tribal 
entities through its UDAAP powers that makes this case so troubling 
for Indian Country. As centuries of Supreme Court precedent 
demonstrates, both the practice of rate exporting and principles of 
tribal sovereign immunity would protect the TLEs from suit by 
various state attorneys general for similar violations. However, by 
funneling state law through a federal enforcement statute, the CFPB 
has ignited a new debate on the preemption of state law and tribal 
self-determination. 
                                                
81 Letter from Michael Pertschuk, FTC Chairman, supra note 68. 
82 CFPB Bulletin 2013-07, Prohibition of Unfair, Deceptive, or Abusive Acts or 
Practices in the Collection of Consumer Debts, 3 n.16 (July 10, 2013), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201307_cfpb_bulletin_unfair-deceptive-
abusive-practices.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VV2-GEFG]. 
83 Id. 
84 CFPB Complaint, supra note 5, at 23–24. 
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IV. A NEW WRINKLE IN THE DEBATE OVER TRIBAL 
SOVEREIGNTY 
 
 The genesis of federal Indian law comes from Supreme 
Court Chief Justice John Marshall’s explanation of state authority 
over Native affairs in Worcester v. Georgia, where he surprisingly 
declared that the laws of Georgia had no force in Cherokee 
territory.85 Preemption is at the heart of the sovereign status of tribal 
nations. While jurisprudence has slightly modified this rule over the 
past two centuries, it still stands as a fundamental tenet of federal 
Indian law. Equally applicable, but not unique to Indian law, is the 
concept of rate exporting—a permissible practice by creditors for 
decades and one that is typically exempt from UDAAP challenges. 
However, the lack of a comprehensive regulatory statute for tribal 
lending similar to gaming (Indian Gaming Regulatory Act) or 
banking (National Banking Act) may cast just enough doubt for the 
court to forge a new path in the online lending industry. Finally this 
section looks at how tribal sovereignty applies to commercial 
activities and how a failed attempt at forum shopping by the CFPB 
almost circumvented these established practices. 
 Considering the CFPB is using the purported violation of 
state usury laws against sovereign economic subdivisions of a 
federally recognized tribe to impute an infringement of federal 
consumer protection laws, it is best to begin by reviewing the 
preemption of state law as it relates to tribal affairs. Worcester v. 
Georgia, a case stemming from the Georgia imprisonment of a 
missionary for entering the Cherokee Nation, is the seminal decision 
on preemption. Worcester, a resident of Vermont, received approval 
from the federal government and permission from the Cherokee 
Nation to enter the tribe’s lands and serve as a missionary to the 
Cherokee people.86 The discovery of gold in Cherokee territory 
shortly before Worcester’s arrival led the Georgia State legislature 
to pass a series of laws that extinguished Cherokee claims to the 
land, divided up the territory, and brought it under Georgia law.87 
Worcester received four years of hard labor for entering Cherokee 
                                                
85 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832). 
86 Id. at 540. 
87 Id. at 542. 
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territory in violation of Georgia law, and he petitioned the United 
States Supreme Court for his release.88 
 Chief Justice John Marshall began the Court’s opinion by 
recognizing the tribe’s claim to possession of the land. He wrote that 
the Cherokees were “the undisputed possessors of the soil, from 
time immemorial.”89 With that possession followed a number of 
rights exclusive to the tribe at the exclusion of state interests. Chief 
Justice Marshall placed a stop on Georgia’s attempted takeover of 
Cherokee lands; he wrote definitively that: 
 
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community 
occupying its own territory, with boundaries 
accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia 
can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia 
have no right to enter, but with the assent of the 
Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with 
treaties, and with the acts of congress.90 
 
Worcester was ordered released from prison, and Georgia lost any 
pretext that it might hold dominion over the Cherokee people and 
their homelands.91 While subsequent courts hesitated to disturb 
Marshall’s proclamation in Worcester, modern preemption analysis 
is less absolute and more fact specific. 
 Modern preemption analysis starts with Williams v. Lee. 
Lee, a non-Indian, owned a general store on the Navajo Nation 
reservation and sold some goods on credit to Paul and Lorena 
Williams.92 He brought suit in Arizona state court when the 
Williamses failed to pay.93 Because the suit involved at least one 
non-Indian party, the Arizona state court concluded it had 
jurisdiction to hear the suit.94 On appeal to the United States 
Supreme Court, the opinion explained that Congress had not 
authorized state jurisdiction over suits arising from a non-Indian 
suing over reservation activity.95 Discussing the effects of the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934, the Court found that tribes were 
                                                
88 Id. at 540. 
89 Id. at 559. 
90 Id. at 561. 
91 Id. at 562–63. 
92 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 218 (1959). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 222. 
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discovering the fullest extents of their own jurisdictions by forming 
centralized governments and establishing tribal courts.96 The 
Supreme Court ultimately held that state law could not be applied to 
reservation activity if it interfered with a tribe’s right to make its 
own laws.97 Lee’s suit could not be tried in Arizona state court. 
 Fifteen years later the Supreme Court added another layer to 
preemption analysis in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Commission.98 In McClanahan, the state of Arizona withheld 
$16.20 in taxes from the wages of a Navajo citizen that lived on the 
Navajo reservation and derived all of her income from reservation 
sources.99 The lower courts examined the case based on the Williams 
v. Lee standard.100 On the narrow question of whether a state tax is 
permissible on tribal citizens who earn all of their income from 
reservation sources, the Supreme Court held that state law would 
only apply if: (1) the law did not interfere with tribal self-
government; and (2) the suit involved a non-Indian.101 The Court 
declined to impose the tax on the Navajo citizen, and the preemption 
analysis earned a second consideration. 
 As tribal governments expanded their influence and flexed 
their sovereign muscles on reservation lands, states continued their 
efforts to chip away at tribal jurisdiction. In New Mexico v. 
Mescalero Apache Tribe, New Mexico sought to apply its own 
hunting and fishing regulations to non-Indians conducting these 
activities on tribal land.102 The tribe developed its own game 
management plan with the federal government and set its own rules 
for hunting and fishing on tribal lands that promoted its management 
plan.103 New Mexico game wardens began arresting non-Indians for 
practices that violated state hunting and fishing laws but followed 
tribal regulations. The Supreme Court determined that “the exercise 
of state authority which imposes additional burdens on a tribal 
enterprise must ordinarily be justified by functions or services 
performed by the State in connection with the on-reservation 
activity.”104 Since the tribe already had regulations and a 
                                                
96 Id. at 220. 
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98 McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). 
99 Id. at 166. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 170–71. 
102 New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 325 (1983). 
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management plan in place that supervised the activities of non-
Indians, state interference was unwarranted. The value generated on 
the reservation through hunting and fishing favored the preemption 
of state law. 
 As more tribes entered the gaming industry in the 1980s, 
states became increasingly resistant to casino operations and many 
sought to block tribal gaming. The Supreme Court’s decision in 
California v. Cabazon was not just another preemption decision; it 
ushered in a new era of tribal economic development.105 California 
attempted to stop the tribe from offering bingo and poker games on 
the reservation. The state had a law that limited bingo to charity 
promotions staffed by volunteers.106 Since the California law sought 
to regulate bingo instead of prohibit the game, the Supreme Court 
decided that the state law was civil in nature and outside the scope 
of California’s participation in Public Law 280.107 The state lacked 
the authority to regulate gaming on reservations. In fact, it was the 
policy of the federal government to encourage reservation economic 
development opportunities like gaming, not limit them.108 Later 
Supreme Court opinions on gaming only reinforced this policy.109 
Despite almost two centuries of Supreme Court jurisprudence 
related to preemption, some forum shopping by the CFPB 
threatened to ignore this invaluable precedent in favor of case law 
that sought to undermine preemption. 
 Jackson v. Payday Financial is a 2014 decision in the 
Seventh Circuit, the same jurisdiction in which the CFPB filed its 
suit against the Upper Lake TLEs. In Payday Financial, the circuit 
court found that state lending laws applied to a loan transaction 
between a private tribal citizen’s lending operation and an Illinois 
resident.110 Payday Financial was a lending entity owned and 
operated by a private tribal citizen based on the Cheyenne River 
Sioux Reservation.111 The loan agreement required that disputes be 
settled with tribal law through arbitration led by either a tribal elder 
                                                
105 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
106 Id. at 205. 
107 Id. at 208. 
108 Id. at 220. 
109 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 62 (1996) (asserting that states 
have been divested of essentially all authority over Indian commerce via the 
Indian Commerce Clause). 
110 Jackson v. Payday Financial, LLC, 764 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2014). 
111 Id. at 768. 
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or a three member panel made from the tribal council.112 The court 
found that none of the tribal elders or council members had any 
experience resolving disputes through arbitration. In one instance 
the tribal elder appointed to serve as arbitrator was the father of an 
employee at the lending business.113 The court determined that the 
arbitration clause was illusory, since there was no way a borrower 
could receive a reasonable arbitration hearing under the terms of the 
loan agreement. The court lamented: 
 
Although the contract language contemplates a 
process conducted under the watchful eye of a 
legitimate governing tribal body, a proceeding 
subject to such oversight simply is not a possibility. 
The arbitrator is chosen in a manner to ensure 
partiality, but, beyond this infirmity, the Tribe has no 
rules for the conduct of the procedure. It hardly 
frustrates FAA [Federal Arbitration Act] provisions 
to void an arbitration clause on the ground that it 
contemplates a proceeding for which the entity 
responsible for conducting the proceeding has no 
rules, guidelines, or guarantees of fairness.114 
 
The judge voided the loan agreement, but chose to take the ruling 
one step further. Not content with simply nullifying the borrower’s 
obligation to repay the loan, the court insisted on wading into 
dangerous waters concerning preemption and the expression of 
tribal sovereignty. The Seventh Circuit wrote: 
 
Here, the Plaintiffs have not engaged in any activities 
inside the reservation. They did not enter the 
reservation to apply for the loans, negotiate the loans, 
or execute loan documents. They applied for loans in 
Illinois by accessing a website. They made payments 
on the loans and paid the financing charges from 
Illinois. Because the Plaintiffs' activities do not 
implicate the sovereignty of the tribe over its land 
and its concomitant authority to regulate the activity 
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of nonmembers on that land, the tribal courts do not 
have jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' claims.115 
 
Relying somewhat on the preemption analysis espoused in 
McClanahan, the court bypassed preemption and the principle of 
rate exporting to place the loan transaction in Illinois and under state 
law. This dicta could have had a major impact on how the Upper 
Lake case is tried and on future litigation involving tribal lenders in 
the Seventh Circuit, but a timely transfer of venue to Kansas should 
mitigate the potentially harmful dicta. Further, a number of 
differences between the two cases could distinguish them enough to 
make the dicta in Jackson inapplicable to Upper Lake. 
 Before contrasting Jackson with the current Upper Lake 
complaint, it is first necessary to explain the unique position tribal 
governments occupy in local economic development efforts. Native 
Americans are only referenced once in the United States 
Constitution, under the power of Congress “To regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian Tribes.”116 As the earliest trade partners to American 
colonists, tribes established vital business relationships with 
European settlers for guns, tools, livestock, and horses. Through 
hundreds of treaties, foreign powers and later the United States 
recognized the sovereign rights of the various tribes scattered across 
North America. Once Chief Justice Marshall distilled the essence of 
tribal sovereignty through the courts, Indians began slowly using 
their unique status to spur economic opportunities and provide for 
their communities. Tribes were left with a certain degree of 
autonomy to create their own governments, exercise immunity from 
suit, and develop jobs for tribal citizens via tribally owned 
enterprises. 
 An important consideration in tribal economic development 
is the transfer of sovereign immunity to tribally owned businesses 
by the tribal government. This extra layer of protection helps tribes 
self-determine their future for residents without fear of constant 
legal challenges draining tribal resources away from other pressing 
reservation needs. The principles of sovereign immunity afforded to 
tribal businesses are historically supported by federal policy and the 
Supreme Court. Supreme Court decisions extend immunity to tribal 
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business activity on and off reservation.117 But as Payday Financial 
discovered, not every tribal business garners immunity, and courts 
across the nation have begun using an “arm of the tribe” analysis to 
determine which entities deserve sovereign protections. Coupled 
with modern jurisprudence regarding rate exporting, the Upper Lake 
TLEs could escape the fate of the lender in Jackson by 
demonstrating their arm-of-the-tribe status and promoting Supreme 
Court precedent regarding off reservation commercial activity. 
 Kiowa v. Manufacturing Technologies marked a watershed 
moment for defining the sovereign powers of tribally owned 
commercial activity. The Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma agreed to 
purchase stock in Manufacturing Technologies via a promissory 
note for $285,000.118 The contract was actually signed in Oklahoma 
City, miles away from Kiowa lands.119 Although the agreement did 
not limit the tribe’s sovereign immunity, the tribe defaulted and the 
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals found that the tribe could be sued 
in state court for commercial activity occurring off-reservation.120 
The United States Supreme Court took a different approach to off-
reservation commercial activity. 
 Before ruling, the Supreme Court distinguished between the 
right to demand compliance with state laws and the means available 
to enforce them.121 The state had the authority to tax cigarette sales 
for instance, but lacked the power to collect those taxes from the 
tribe and ultimately held that the tribe was immune from suit for off-
reservation commercial activity.122  Again, the Supreme Court left 
any changes to this principle to Congress.123 As the branch of 
government constitutionally charged with regulating commerce 
with tribes, only Congress retained the power to abrogate tribal 
immunity in commercial matters. 
 Despite its holding, the Supreme Court did provide a word 
of caution to non-Indian parties seeking to conduct business with 
tribal entities. The majority wrote, “In this economic context, 
immunity can harm those who are unaware that they are dealing with 
a tribe, who do not know of tribal immunity, or who have no choice 
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in the matter, as in the case of tort victims.”124 This concern is likely 
assuaged in the Upper Lake case. For instance, Golden Valley 
Lending provides a disclaimer on the homepage of its website 
informing consumers that it is “owned and operated by Golden 
Valley Lending, Inc., a tribal lending entity wholly owned and 
operated by the Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake, California, 
which is a sovereign nation located within the United States of 
America, and is operating within the tribe's reservation.”125 The 
CFPB even pled that the loan agreements clearly state that loans 
originate on tribal land and are governed by tribal law, regardless of 
residence of borrower.126 The TLEs also provided a mailing address 
to the tribe’s regulatory commission for borrowers to send 
additional questions or concerns. For instance unlike a tort case in 
which a tribal employee hits a non-Indian with a company vehicle, 
the consumers are given notification of the tribe’s interest in the TLE 
and many of the legal ramifications of accepting the loan. It is 
unlikely the concerns of the court in Kiowa would be present in the 
Upper Lake case. 
 The Supreme Court revisited its decision in Kiowa in 2014 
in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community. In Bay Mills, a compact 
with the state restricted the tribe from pursuing gaming outside tribal 
lands.127 Nonetheless, Bay Mills opened a class III gaming operation 
in Vanderbilt, about 125 miles from its reservation in the Upper 
Peninsula.128 The tribe had bought the property in Vanderbilt with 
proceeds from a federal appropriation in which “any land acquired 
shall be held as Indian lands are held.”129 The Supreme Court 
examined whether tribal sovereign immunity barred the suit for off-
reservation gaming. Since Michigan had argued the gaming 
operation was outside tribal lands, the Indian Gaming Regulatory 
Act (IGRA) did not apply.130 The state could have easily bargained 
to restrict Indian gaming off reservation in its gaming compact with 
Bay Mills. The Supreme Court further recognized that in the fifteen 
years since Kiowa, Congress had declined to abrogate sovereign 
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immunity for off-reservation commercial activity.131 Thus, the court 
reinforced Kiowa and retained important tribal sovereign immunity 
protections for Native economic development. 
 The Supreme Court pointed out in Bay Mills that tribes 
followed the decision in Kiowa closely and built important business 
practices around the holding. The court reasoned, “tribes across the 
country, as well as entities and individuals doing business with 
them, have for many years relied on Kiowa (along with its forebears 
and progeny), negotiating their contracts and structuring their 
transactions against a backdrop of tribal immunity.”132 With this in 
mind, Upper Lake set up its loan agreements to impute its own tribal 
lending code. The tribe has agreements with a few different states, 
not unlike gaming compacts under IGRA, that further define their 
sovereign rights and the rights of consumers in those states that enter 
into loan agreements with the tribe’s TLEs.133 Through its lawsuit, 
the CFPB seeks to dismantle the tribe’s considerable work in 
negotiating responsible lending compacts with states and 
developing its own lending code to govern operations. 
 Enhancing tribal efforts on self-regulation, the United States 
Department of the Treasury issued a series of initiatives shortly after 
the passing of Dodd–Frank aimed at promoting responsible and 
sustainable lending and access to capital in Indian Country. Under 
one particular initiative, the Treasury wrote: 
 
Empowering tribal governments to enforce the 
laws on reservations: Tribal governments will be 
permitted to enforce the CFPB’s rules in areas under 
their jurisdiction, the same way that states will be 
permitted to enforce those rules. In addition, tribal 
consumer financial protection codes will be 
protected, so that tribal governments can set 
standards that are tougher than the federal standards 
to afford greater protections for their citizens under 
those codes.134 
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Likely with this consideration in mind, Upper Lake established an 
independent regulatory commission to enforce its tribal lending 
code and address customer issues. But as the CFPB demonstrated in 
its CID case against other TLEs, the Bureau is unwilling to respect 
tribal sovereignty in this area, the Supreme Court’s precedent in 
Kiowa, or an initiative from the Treasury. 
For sovereign tribal nations, their immunity extends to 
economic and political subdivisions, often called “arms of the 
tribe.”135 Since the Supreme Court has yet to articulate an arm-of-
the-tribe analysis, various state and lower federal courts have 
developed their own methods of separating true extensions of the 
tribal government from private businesses operated from tribal 
lands, like in Jackson.136 At the state level, different jurisdictions 
have turned to analysis of the business through some combination 
of method of creation, financial relationship, and operational 
relationship examination. California takes a balanced approach and 
uses a five-factor test reviewing how the entity was created, 
immunity sharing by the tribal government, the entity’s purpose, 
tribal council control over the entity, and the financial relationship 
between tribe and entity.137 Arizona places a higher emphasis on the 
potential liability to the tribe if the entity is sued.138 The state of 
Washington focuses on whether the entity was created and owned 
by the tribe.139 There is slightly more standardization in federal 
courts. 
The Tenth Federal Circuit Court relies on the Breakthrough 
factors.140 The Breakthrough factors closely mirror the recently 
adopted California standard, except they require that “the purposes 
of tribal sovereign immunity are served by granting [the entity] 
immunity.”141 The Ninth Circuit follows a similar standard.142 While 
few facts have been pled thus far to conduct a proper arm-of-the-
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tribe analysis, previous statements by Chairperson Treppa to 
Congress tend to support the extension of sovereign immunity to 
Upper Lake’s TLEs, including the tribal government’s creation of 
the TLEs, the use of TLE revenues for sovereign government 
functions, and TLE oversight via a tribally developed regulatory 
commission.143 Further, through her concurrence in Bay Mills, 
Justice Sotomayor echoed the importance of tribal economic 
development to federal Indian policy: “A key goal of the Federal 
Government is to render Tribes more self-sufficient, and better 
positioned to fund their own sovereign functions, rather than relying 
on federal funding.”144 Exerting their sovereign powers through 
economic arms of the tribe is the best method for tribes to achieve 
self-sufficiency. 
Rate exporting is the practice by which a financial institution 
is permitted to charge an interest rate commensurate with the laws 
of the institution’s home state rather than the laws of the debtor’s 
state. This practice is consistent with the century-old National 
Banking Act (NBA) and Supreme Court precedent. However, as the 
refusal of the Seventh Circuit in Jackson to recognize this practice 
and impose the laws of Illinois on the loan transaction demonstrates, 
the CFPB’s choice of venue might not have occurred by chance. By 
angling for favorable circuit precedent in Illinois, the Bureau 
attempted to nullify tribal lending laws and strengthen the agency’s 
use of state law violations in their UDAAP claims. 
In 1978, the Supreme Court asked in Marquette Bank v. First 
of Omaha whether a bank could charge interest rates consistent with 
its home state regulation if it was higher than the rates permitted by 
the consumer’s home state.145 Nebraska law permitted a bank to 
charge 18% interest on the first $999 charged to the credit card and 
12% for the subsequent balance.146 Minnesota law capped interest 
for the entire balance at 12%.147 Marquette was forced to institute a 
small initiation fee to remain as profitable as Omaha. However, the 
Minnesota bank began losing customers due to the fee. Omaha could 
maintain profitability without the fee.148 The NBA permitted banks 
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to charge interest rates consistent with the laws of the state where 
the bank’s deposits “are to be carried on.”149 The Supreme Court 
was asked to clarify a bank’s location under the NBA. 
The court refused to conclude that a bank soliciting 
customers in Minnesota was de facto located in Minnesota under the 
NBA. The court wrote: 
 
Although the convenience of modern mail permits 
Minnesota residents to holding Omaha Bank’s 
Bankamericard to receive loans without visiting 
Nebraska, credit on the use of their cards is 
nevertheless similarly extended by Omaha Bank in 
Nebraska by the bank's honoring of the sales drafts 
of participating Minnesota merchants and banks.150 
 
And the practice of rate exporting was given the Supreme Court’s 
seal of approval. 
 Almost two decades later, the Supreme Court again was 
asked to resolve another exporting case, except this time the case 
involved the issuance by a bank of late fees deemed permissible in 
the bank’s home state but illegal in the customer’s home state. At 
the same time as this case was being decided, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) issued guidance on the subject 
and concluded that late fees constituted “interest” under the NBA 
and were subject to the same rate export standards espoused in 
Marquette.151 The Supreme Court lent deference to the agency’s 
interpretation of the NBA and concluded that late fees were interest 
under the NBA.152 However, the jurisprudence on rate exporting 
uncovers a few potential points of contention in the Upper Lake 
case. 
 First, there is no National Bank Act for small-dollar lending. 
Whereas the National Bank Act has stood for a century, small-dollar 
online lending is still in its infancy. This could make reliance on 
Marquette and its progeny shaky in the face of the Seventh Circuit’s 
dicta in Jackson. Further, the CFPB is afforded automatic Chevron 
deference under Dodd–Frank.153 Although the agency has not yet 
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issued any guidance on UDAAP and tribal rate exporting, there is 
nothing to stop the Bureau from doing so. In fact, the OCC’s 
guidance in Smiley was issued precisely because of that particular 
litigation, so it is not as if the CFPB is barred from such tactics 
during litigation.154 The Upper Lake TLEs have managed to fight 
the unfavorable precedent in Illinois through the recent granting of 
a motion to change venue to Kansas where their call center and other 
ancillary services are housed.155 The move to Kansas should give 
the tribal defendants more favorable precedent on rate exporting and 
arm-of-the-tribe sovereign considerations. 
 Like so many cases involving tribal affairs, the issue of the 
exercise of tribal sovereignty will be at the center of the litigation. 
The established principles of preemption, arm-of-the-tribe 
sovereign immunity, and rate exporting would ordinarily shield 
TLEs from a suit alleging violations of state usury laws. However, 
the unique nature of the CFPB’s UDAAP pleading leaves the 
outcome of this case in doubt. The impacts of an adverse decision 
against the TLEs could reverberate throughout Indian Country and 
hamper not only the exercise of tribal sovereignty, but reservation 
economic development as well. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
On July 10, 2017, the CFPB issued its final rule concerning 
consumers’ rights to bring class action lawsuits against financial 
service providers, targeting the common requirement that borrowers 
agree to binding arbitration when signing the loan agreement.156 The 
new rule included an exemption for tribal governments and their 
“arms.”157 Although Congress would later repeal the rule through 
the Congressional Review Act, this rule was a recognition at the 
agency that only Congress, or a tribe through an express waiver, may 
abrogate sovereign immunity from suit. Unfortunately, this 
awareness is contradicted in the agency’s enforcement division, 
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where it now seeks to abrogate tribal immunity from state law 
through its UDAAP enforcement statute. 
If a private party or even state attorney general brought this 
suit, precedent is clear that it would be quickly dismissed by the 
courts on preemption and immunity grounds. However, the CFPB 
added a unique wrinkle to these traditional concepts of federal 
Indian law by relying on a federal statute to enforce otherwise 
inapplicable state laws against a sovereign tribal enterprise. Such 
agency overreach was never the intent of its creator or decades of 
United States Supreme Court precedent regarding rate exporting and 
the lack of authority state law holds over tribes and their sovereign 
functions. 
For tribes like the Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake, 
cultural, geographic, and economic isolation have perpetuated 
cycles of poverty, abuse, and despair. E-commerce represents an 
opportunity for remote tribal communities to connect with the nation 
at large and participate in one of the fastest growing sectors in the 
national and international economy. This case will go far in 
determining the future of the multi-billion dollar tribal lending 
industry, as well as potentially alter tribal sovereignty for 
generations to come. 
